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CHAPTER 2 
 
NON FORMAL CREDIT FOR RURAL AGRICULTURAL AREAS: 
NEW EVIDENCE FOR AN OLD PROBLEM 
 
 
Carolina Trivelli1 
 
Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to show the complex relationship among different 
lenders in the agricultural sector. Formal, semi formal and informal lenders coexist, 
sometimes competing and at others complementing their activities to shape the 
financial markets for different sectors in the Peruvian economy. There is no 
difference in the agricultural sector, one the most affected by the lack of access to 
capital. This paper presents evidence of the activities of both sides, borrowers and 
lenders, in order to improve credit allocation and increase agricultural activity, and 
concludes on the need to consider the activities of crucial participants, such as semi 
formal lenders, in the design of an agricultural policy aimed at improving the 
development of the credit market relevant to this sector. 
 
The article concludes by presenting evidence suggesting the existence of a 
complementary relationship between formal and semi formal lenders as well as 
competition between both types of lenders. This conclusion suggests that in order to 
develop the credit market for agriculture in Peru we need to consider not only the 
formal sector but also others, especially the semi formal lenders. 
 
1. Market size: importance of non formal lenders 
 
One of the problems faced by Peru’s agricultural sector is the limited access to 
credit2. For a long period of time most credit for agriculture came from a State bank, 
the Banco Agrario (BA). The BA ended its operations in 1992 and, as part of a 
program of structural adjustment and financial liberalization, agricultural credit was 
supposed to come mainly from private formal lenders3. However, as we will discuss 
later, private financial lenders were not able to provide enough credit, so the 
problem of lack of credit continued and probably became worse. 
 
A common question about credit market, at least in the case of Peruvian agriculture, 
continues to be the size of the market. Due to the intrinsic difficulties involved in 
answering this question, we usually use the total amount of credit allocated to the 
agricultural sector. However, the existing statistics report only credit allocated by the 
                                                
1 Director and researcher of Institute of Peruvian Studies (Instituto de Estudios Peruanos: 
IEP)I need to thank Johanna Yancari and Bruno Iriarte for their help in the preparation of this 
paper. 
2 This problem has been recognized by researchers and policy makers of all political 
tendencies. See for example Escobal (2000), Gonzales de Olarte (1997), Valdivia and Silva 
(1997), Trivelli (2000); Alvarado and Ugaz (1998), among others. 
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3 For a review of the main features of the financial liberalisation of the early 90´s see Trivelli, 
Alvarado and Galarza (2001). 
formal sector4. With this restriction, and considering only the amount of formal credit, 
we are clearly underestimating the total amount of agricultural credit. The question is 
how far is this number from the real value of credit going to the agricultural sector. 
 
As shown in the table below (table 1), in the last decade formal credit to agriculture 
reached a peak of around US$ 500 million per year. Nevertheless, the agricultural 
sector represents a small portion of financial activities for most formal lenders. The 
total amount of formal loans allocated to agricultural activities represents around 
12% of agricultural GDP, showing a reduction compared to the era of the BA (Trivelli, 
2001). Estimates made by Valdivia (1995) show that the BA allocated during the 
80´s around 20% of agricultural GDP in loans to the sector. Similarly, the number of 
agricultural clients (in the formal sector) in its last years was around 23,000. This 
figure shows another dimension of the problem when compared to more than 
200,000 clients of the now defunct BA. 
 
Table 1: Formal Credit to the agricultural sector 
(US$ millions) 
 
Time period Banks Financial 
institutions 
CMAC CRAC Total formal sector 
95.12 256.0 2.9 3.1 10.9 272.9 
96.12 354.2 1.7 6.5 23.9 386.3 
97.12 438.4 3.4 8.8 32.8 483.5 
98.12 441.0 4.8 12.0 36.8 494.6 
99.12 374.0 1.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
00.03 375.0 0.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
00.06 389.0 0.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
00.09 393.2 0.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 Nº Institutions 23 6 13 13  
 % Agricultural 3.2% 1.6% 12.8% 63.6%  
loans/total loans      
 
Source: Superintendencia de Banca y Seguros  
Taken from Trivelli 2001 
 
In this context of limited resources flowing from the formal financial sector to 
agricultural activities, the obvious question is what about other credit sources?. Non 
formal lenders are quite important for several reasons and not just in the agricultural 
sector. However, in the Peruvian agricultural sector, the amount of resources 
allocated by these non formal lenders using different technologies, having a flexible 
supply of credit and considering the limited amount of formal credit suggests that 
there are sufficient arguments in favor of a non formal pool of credit suppliers that 
serve a significant portion of the agricultural credit market. Non formal agents by 
definition are difficult to identify, not only as group but also their impact and their 
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4 Formal credit is that provided by formal financial institutions, which are under the supervision 
of the Superintendencia de Banca y Seguros (SBS). The formal institutions in Peru are: 
Banks, Cajas Rurales de Ahorro y Crédito (CRAC), Cajas Municipales de Ahorro y Crédito 
(CMAC), Financial Institutions and Entidades de Desarrollo de la Pequeña y Microempresa 
(EDPYME).  For the meaning of acronyms, see the end of this chapter. 
performance. However, their activities are crucial to understanding the agricultural 
credit market. 
 
Before discussing details of non formal credit, we need to mention the importance of 
making use of term “non formal” credit instead of “informal” one. We differ from most 
studies (Hoff et al., 1993, Floro and Yotopoulos, 1991; Bell, 1990; Siamwalla et al., 
1990; Steel et al., 1997; McMillan and Woodruff, 1999;among others) as we do not 
use the common dichotomy between formal and informal credit markets. We 
recognize the importance of an “in between” type of lender: the semi formal one, 
with unique characteristics, different from informal as well as from formal lenders. 
The semi formal lenders together with the traditional informal lenders, are not 
recognized as financial intermediaries, so in that sense they are part of the “non 
formal group”. Non formal lenders are also divided into two groups, semi formal and 
informal sources. The first group is defined as institutional lenders that are not 
financial intermediaries and the second group consists of individuals5. 
 
There are no estimates of the total amount of resources allocated by non-formal 
agents, but different studies show that these lenders are as important as formal 
lenders (and in some cases even more important). It is usually assumed that non 
formal transactions are very common but imply reduced amounts, specific purposes 
and a short maturity. We will come back to the products and their characteristics in 
the next section, but it is necessary to discuss two issues: coverage (number of 
clients) and total amount of resources lent. 
 
As far as coverage of non formal lenders is concerned, and considering the many 
limitations of measures of credit access, national level surveys (ENNIV 6 ) have 
shown that in rural areas non formal lenders are the most mentioned. Table 2 shows 
the reduced percentage of households that have had access to credit (from any 
source) in different regions of the country in the last decade, revealing a lack of 
access to credit in general, and more dramatically in rural areas. 
 
Table 2. Households with credit: 1994, 1997 and 2000 
 
Region ENNIV 1994 ENNIV 1997 ENNIV 2000 
 Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural 
With credit 
(%Households (hh.))
  
16.6
  
16.7 
  
16.4 
  
32.0
  
38.1
  
22.1
  
16.5
  
18.4 
  
13.0 
 REGIONS          
Coastal (% hh) 13.0 12.0 18.2 36.9 38.7 29.3 16.7 17.0 13.3 
Highlands (% hh.) 17.9 22.1 14.9 25.7 36.7 18.3 15.1 20.6 11.9 
Jungle (% hh.) 22.2 25.9 18.0 30.2 37.6 22.6 20.2 24.6 16.2 
 
Source: ENNIV 1994, 1997 and 2000 
Elaborated: IEP 
                                                
5 In the semi formal lenders we have included the MAG loans (some in kind and some rotating 
funds) and the Banco de Materiales, which is actually not a bank in formal terms (it lends 
materials to build houses) but it is referred to in that way. 
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6 Encuestas Nacionales de Niveles de Vida 
 
Table 3 presents the main sources of credit mentioned by households with credit. As 
can be seen, only Banks, CMAC and Cooperatives are formal lenders, and these 
represent less than 23% of the sources mentioned in rural areas7 for the year 2000. 
To emphasize the point, although based on general information (at household level), 
formal lenders work with a reduced percentage of households having loans in rural 
areas. 
 
Table 3 . Households with loans by source of credit: 1994, 1997 and 2000 
(% of households with credit) 
 
ENNIV 1994 ENNIV 1997 ENNIV 2000 
Source of credit Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural 
                    
Individual  33.1 29.8 38.8 13.6 11.2 19.7 20.0 14.8 33.9 
Bank 7.0 10.3 1.4 26.7 33.9 7.2 28.8 33.4 16.5 
CMAC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.7 4.7 4.7 
Cooperative 5.2 7.3 1.4 5.0 5.8 2.9 6.0 7.6 1.6 
Enterprise 12.5 16.3 5.9 8.5 11.3 1.1 3.1 3.7 1.2 
Small store 14.2 20.9 40.2 39.7 29.8 66.9 30.9 29.1 35.7 
Others 28.0 15.4 12.3 6.5 8.0 2.2 6.6 6.6 6.4 
           
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: ENNIV 1994, 1997 and 2000 
Elaborated: IEP 
 
Case studies provide additional, and more precise, information about the importance 
of informal lenders to agricultural producers. Trivelli and Venero (1999) showed, for 
the case of the Huaral valley, a highly dynamic and integrated region, that 47% of 
farmers had access to credit. Of these loans 68.9% were obtained from non formal 
lenders. They also found that from the total number of transactions registered during 
their field work with a random sample of small farmers, 57% of the transactions 
involved non formal lenders. Boucher (2001) found that in four valleys of Piura 
nearly 67% of total loans came from non financial lenders. Alvarado et al (2001), 
based on random samples of rural households in two different regions (one on the 
coast and the other one in the highlands), also found that non formal transactions 
predominated in rural areas; around 87% of all loans in rural areas came from non 
formal sources. 
 
The importance of non formal lenders in providing access to specific segment of 
credit client is recognized. Nonetheless, with respect to the amount of resources 
involved in non formal transactions it is usually assumed that they imply small sum 
of money (lots of small and micro credits). Based on this hypothesis, the importance 
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7 Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that formal lenders, mainly commercial banks, have 
significantly increased their presence in rural areas. Table 3 shows that in 1994 only 1.4% of 
rural households with loans mentioned banks as their main source of credit, while in 2000 this 
percentage was 16.5%. 
of non formal lenders is limited to their impact in terms of coverage (number of 
transactions). However, Alvarado et al. (2001) found that this may not be the case 
for the Peruvian agricultural sector. Their research showed that, in contrast to the 
other two economic sectors in the study8, in the case of rural households, non formal 
lenders were important in terms of number of transactions as well as in terms of the 
total amount of resources allocated9. Table 4 shows the significance of non formal 
transactions in a random sample of rural households from two different regions 
studied by Alvarado´s research team10. 
 
Table 4. Volume of credit transactions in rural households in two regions 
 (US$) 
 
Regions 
Credit Source Lenders TOTAL CREDIT Junin La Libertad 
FORMAL Banks, CRAC, CMAC, EDPYME 114,897 34,064 80,832 
Semi-
formal 
MAG, NGOs, Traders, 
Input stores, etc. 280,018 66,237 213,781 
Informal 
Family and friends, 
individual traders, small 
retailers, etc. 
82,748 12,447 70,302 
NON 
FORMAL 
TOTAL  362,766 78,684 284,083 
TOTAL CREDIT REGISTERED 477,663 112,748 364,915 
% Non formal credit in sample 76% 70% 78% 
 
Source: Alvarado et al. (2001) 
 
From the evidence presented it is useful to remind two issues: a) Although the size 
of the agricultural credit market is not known, if we only consider formal transactions 
we are clearly underestimating the market’s size. b) Non formal lenders are 
important not only in terms of number of transactions but also in terms of the amount 
of resources allocated, at least in the case of the Peruvian agricultural sector. 
 
One remaining question is the relationship between formal and non-formal lenders. 
Are they competing or complementing each other? Do non formal transactions 
appear when formal lenders do not want to supply credit or when the formal sector is 
too small? Do non formal transactions constitute a different financial product 
(compared to the formal ones) so that they do not compete with the formal sector? If 
one or more of the answers to these questions is affirmative, then we could say that 
non formal lenders complement the formal sector’s activities. However, it is possible 
that non formal lenders could be replacing formal ones as well, as when they offer 
similar types of credit to similar clients. In the next section we will discuss these 
issues to approach an answer to questions about the relationship between formal 
and non formal lenders in rural areas. 
                                                
8 Wholesale traders and micro-entrepreneurs.  
9 Trivelli and Venero (1999) and Boucher (2001) do not present information regarding the total 
amount of resources from each source. Both studies only work at the level of individual credit 
transactions. 
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10 In each of the two regions a random sample of 200 households was examined, with a 
maximum error of 7%. 
2. Formal and non formal lenders in rural areas: evidence and relationships 
 
In order to understand the relationship between formal and non formal lenders, in 
this section, we will discuss the existence – or not – of common credit types offered 
by different lenders and whether their lending technologies are similar, based on 
empirical evidence from two Peruvian agricultural areas. Finally, we present a 
simple test based on a probit model to explore the type of relationship existing 
between formal and non formal lenders. 
 
The following analysis is based on evidence collected in two rural areas during 2000 
as part of the research presented in Alvarado et al (2001). The data base has 400 
cases (rural households) selected at random in two agricultural areas, one in the 
coastal region and the other in the highlands. Both regions are well integrated with 
product and input markets. Agriculture is the main economic activity for most cases 
(94% of the households depend primarily on agriculture). The survey used to collect 
the information was carefully designed to capture credit transactions, especially the 
non formal ones. 
 
From the 400 households in the sample, only 107 cases lacked any source of credit 
in the 12 months prior to the survey. Although this result, 73% of households with 
credit, shows that credit accessibility is significantly above national levels for rural 
areas presented in the previous section (based on ENNIV), the results are similar to 
those obtained by Trivelli and Venero (1999) and by Boucher (2001). 
 
As mentioned before (table 4), non formal sources are the more important ones in 
terms of total resources involved in credit transactions. In the non formal sector, 
semi-formal transactions, those coming from enterprises and businesses not 
specialized in financial activities, are the most significant. In the case of the 
department of La Libertad this is especially significant due to the importance of rice 
mills that become important local lenders. 
 
In terms of coverage the figure is quite similar, showing the predominance of non 
formal transactions. However, as predicted by the theory, informal transactions 
(credit from individuals) are more frequently reported. A total of 510 transactions 
was reported by the 293 households with credit, from these, 63 transactions came 
from the formal sector, 197 from semi formal lenders and 250 from informal sources. 
 
Credit types and lending technologies 
 
As usual, credits allocated in these two rural areas vary widely. Table 5 presents a 
summary of the characteristics of the reported credits by lender. As shown, formal 
credits imply significantly larger amounts. The median formal transaction is about 
US$ 1,156, compared to a median of US$ 477 for the semi formal lenders and less 
than US$40 for the informal lenders. Clearly, the size of loans varies considerably 
among lenders. 
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Table 5. Credit Technology 
 
Formal    Semi formal Informal
Description 
Bank Edpyme/Coop. CRAC CMAC Total NGO
Private 
semi formal
MINAG/ 
Ban. Mat. Total 
Individual 
trader small 
retailer 
Informal 
lender
Family and 
friends,
neighbor
Total
Total
Me*     1499.2 925.4 3112.0 1155.2 1823.8 1450.4 1599.7 834.4 1421.5 33.6 759.1 358.7 331.0 936.6
Credit amount (US$) 
Med*        1300.6 740.2 3000.0 867.1 1156.1 433.5 708.1 433.5 476.9 14.5 173.4 86.7 37.6 231.2
Me*          10.8 5.1 10.2 7.8 8.6 6.9 5.9 70.2 19.4 0.9 4.3 6.1 2.9 10.0
Maturity (months) 
Med*          9.0 6.0 10.0 8.0 7.0 6.0 6.0 72.0 6.0 0.5 5.0 6.0 1.0 5.0
Collateral 
(yes) %          72.7 91.7 100.0 89.5 90.5 76.0 47.3 31.7 47.7 8.2 2.8 31.0
Need Project 
(yes) %          9.1 4.8 5.3 4.8 8.0 3.1 14.6 6.1 2.4 2.4 2.0 3.9
Me*          2.7 2.8 2.8 2.1 2.5 2.2 4.8 3.0 4.1 9.7 11.5 17.3 11.5 7.5
Selec-
tion 
Year knowing 
lender (years) Med*          2.0 2.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 6.0 6.0 10.0 7.0 3.0
Moni- 
toring Visits           % 27.3 83.3 57.1 42.1 52.4 60.0 44.3 56.1 48.7 16.5 5.6 28.0
Actions taken               
1            % 33.3 20.0 12.5 20.0 20.0 9.4 88.9 43.8 31.9 22.2 40.0 31.2 35.2
2            % 16.7 40.0 37.5 30.0 40.0 59.4 32.8 61.7 66.7 60.0 62.3 44.8
Reco-
very 
3             % 33.3 40.0 25.0 30.0 40.0 21.9 7.4 17.2 11.7
Default rate (late 
payments and 
default) 
%          54.6 41.7 38.1 5.3 31.8 20.0 24.4 65.9 32.5 37.3 11.8 12.8 24.8 28.6
Me*          47.5 13.6 48.7 11.8 30.7 22.7 9.4 64.3 22.5 2.1 6.0 6.9 4.2 14.6Time to obtain 
credit (days) Med*          44.0 2.5 28.0 5.0 14.0 14.0 2.0 32.0 4.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
 
* Me: average; Med: median. 
1Actions: 1. Did not do anything, 2. Extend maturity and 3. Increase interest rate. 
Source: Alvarado et al. (2001). 
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Loan maturity seems to be different as well. Although we did not find a significant 
difference between formal and semi-formal lenders, there is an important difference 
between these two and the informal loans (see table 5). The median length of a loan 
from formal lenders is 7 months and for semi-formal lenders is 61. These subtle 
differences could be explained by the characteristics of the sector - fixed agricultural 
cycle, limited crop diversity in each region, etc. -. However, if one reviews specific 
lenders in each group important differences are found. Banks and CRAC on one 
hand had an average loan maturity of 10-11 months, while NGOs and traders had 
an average maturity of 6-7 months. 
 
Credit offered by different lenders appear to be quite different. Formal lenders, as 
expected, make larger loans and lend for longer periods than semi formal lenders. 
Semi formal lenders make larger loans and lend for longer periods than informal 
lenders. Two additional characteristics of credit’s transactions helped us illustrate 
the differences in the types of credit offered by different lenders2. In the first place, 
formal transactions are 99% in cash, while semi formal are 60% in cash and 40% in 
kind (inputs, services, etc.)3. Secondly, transaction costs are significantly different 
among lenders. As shown in table 5, the number of days required to obtain a loan 
from a formal source varies from 47 days in average for a bank loan to 11 days to 
obtain a CMAC loan, significantly above the 22 days required in a NGO and the 9 
days to obtain a loan from a trader or input store. The extreme case, as expected, is 
the 4 day average required to obtain an informal credit. 
 
In general terms one can say that there are significant differences in the credit 
offered by each lender. The extreme cases would be, on one side commercial banks 
in the formal sector and, on the other side, informal loans from family and friends. 
However, recognizing these differences, what we actually see is a range of options 
and types of credit that are not completely different. For example, some formal 
transactions are related to products offered also by some NGOs or traders; or 
repeated loans with a semi formal could be similar to a formal loan. We will come 
back to this issue after reviewing some aspects of the credit technology. 
 
Table 5 includes interesting features about the credit technology used by each type 
of lender. In first place, it is clear that the selection technology marks important 
differences among lenders. These differences also imply “filters” for certain types of 
borrowers as we discussed in a other study4. As part of the selection process a 
formal lender requires collateral in more than 90% of the cases. This requirement, 
induced by current financial legislation5, could represent an important filter for those 
                                                
1 Median without considering loans from MAG or Banco de Materiales (Banmat). 
2 We are leaving the price --interest rate—out of the analyses on purpose because no reliable 
data was obtained.  
3 In the department of La Libertad most semi formal lenders are rice mills that lend in cash 
and receive rice as payment. Probably in some other agricultural settings the percentage of 
cash transactions could be even lower. 
4 See Trivelli (2001).  
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5 Financial law states that although loans can be granted without collateral, when certain 
types of collateral (houses, bonds, land, etc.) are included as guarantees, the required 
“provisions” that the lender has to make for that credit are significantly lower.  
borrowers with no collateral and/or with interest in small scale loans6. Semi formal 
lenders ask for some type of collateral only in 50% of the transactions and informal 
lenders in the majority of cases, do not ask for collateral. Therefore, borrowers with 
no real collateral will probably decide not go to formal lenders. 
 
A second characteristic of the selection technology that marks a difference is the 
relation between the borrower and the lender. As expected, in the formal sector we 
found that borrowers have known the lender for two and a half years, on average; 
the semi formal clients have known the lender for 4 years approximately and 
borrower and lender have known each other for 11 years on average in the informal 
sector. The more informal the transaction, the more time borrower and lender were 
related. 
 
Monitoring credits is another distinctive part of the credit technology. However, the 
only significant differences arise when comparing informal transactions with formal 
and semi formal. We could not conclude that formal and semi formal lenders have 
different approaches to the monitoring of their credits. 
 
Finally, on the action taken to recover overdue loans, we found interesting evidence 
of different approaches. Formal lenders usually increased the interest rate or 
extended the maturity to recover the credits, while semi formals did not take any 
actions and informals extended the date of payment. 
 
What we have described shows that credit technologies differ among lenders in a 
similar way to types of credit. However, the differences in technology between 
formal and semi formal lenders are not as significant as one would expect, leaving 
open the option for some competition among these lenders for the same type of  
clients. These results, together with the comparison of the credits allocated by each 
lender, could suggest that while informal and formal lenders are completely different, 
seeking to serve different clients, with different types of credit and technology; semi 
formal lenders could be competing with formal lenders in some segments and 
complementing formal transactions in some others. If this is the case, the range of 
formal-semi formal transactions cannot be easily analyzed through the cut of 
“formality”. We will need better instruments and in depth analyses to learn how the 
competing segment is defined and what marks the beginning of the complementing 
segment. The argument of the existence of both relationship, competition and 
complementarity among formal and semi formal lenders is also supported by several 
cases (18% of the households with credit had credit from more than one source, 
mainly one formal and one non formal). 
 
The evidence presented shows that the non formal sector is a very heterogeneous 
one, and that it is more accurate to talk in terms of at least two major groups: semi 
formal and informal lenders. These two non formal lenders’ groups have different 
type of relationships with the formal lenders. Clearly the informal lenders 
complement activities of formal lenders, serving clients with different types of credit 
with a extremely flexible technology. The semi formal lenders are the interesting 
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6 Trivelli and Venero (1999) found that the for the average loan granted to a small farmer (5 
hectares in average, loans around US$1000 per hectare) the cost of using their land as 
collateral represented a sunk cost near to 4-5% of the total loan received. 
case, where credits (the type of credit offered) tend to be similar to the formal ones, 
but on a smaller scale and credit technology tends to go by the same path but with 
important differences for specific segments. We could say that semi formal lenders 
compete with formal lenders when the latter offers cash credits with a maturity of 6 
months or more to clients with collateral and a known history. On the other hand, 
semi formal lenders complement formal activities when they lend to clients with no 
collateral, for short periods of time, when they sell inputs in advance, etc. One 
additional comment is that some semi formal lenders work with formal credit 
themselves, providing another source of complementarity among lenders. 
 
If this is the case, any measure to increase the allocation of credit in the agricultural 
sector has to consider that formal and semi formal lenders work very closely or 
consider only the impact on the formal transaction side. 
 
Relationship among lenders: using Probit estimations to understand 
predominant relation between formal and non formal lenders 
 
Using the described data set we produced a probit model to illustrate which of the 
two types of possible relationship prevails among formal and non formal lenders: 
competence or complementarity. 
 
The model is quite simple. We ran a probit function on the probability of having a 
formal credit over a number of variables, including one on having or not non formal 
credit. Similarly we ran another probit function to estimate the probability of having 
credit from a non formal source (with the same explanatory variables and the 
variable capturing if one has also formal credit). Estimated results include a rho 
coefficient which provides evidence on the type of relationship existing between 
formal and non formal credit suppliers7. 
 
The estimated results show a negative rho coefficient, meaning the prevalence of a 
competing relationship among formal and non formal lenders (see Annex 1). 
However, theory states that the type of substitution associated with a negative rho 
coefficient is associated with an imperfect substitution. The prevalence of this 
relationship can be explained by all the evidence presented in the previous section, 
but also because in the data collected, semi formal transactions were the most 
important in terms of the total amount of credit and were close to being the most 
important source of credit in terms of transactions. 
 
In any case, what we find is that semi formal lenders actually compete with formal 
lenders in a significant portion of the credit market for agriculture, meaning that 
formal activities, the ones encouraged by the MAG and by financial authorities (SBS, 
COFIDE, BCRP), are not the ones defining the structure and development of the 
credit market in this sector. This result shows the need to include new agents in the 
equation of the credit market for agriculture, agents having cross incentives with 
traditional agents; participants that could change the result of policy measures. 
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7 For a detailed explanation of the econometric procedure see Greene (2000). 
3. Final Remarks 
 
The main conclusions of the article are: 
 
1. No one knows for sure the size of the credit market for the Peruvian agricultural 
sector. If we base estimates on the formal lenders’ activity we are always 
underestimating the real size of the market. 
 
2. Non formal lenders are quite important. Semi formal and informal lenders are 
crucial not only in terms of coverage (as most literature agrees), but sometimes 
they are also significant in terms of the total amount of resources lent to the 
agricultural sector. We present empirical evidence of one such case. In our case 
study non formal resources are more important than the ones brokered by 
formal lenders. 
 
3. Formal and non formal credits in rural areas (mostly agricultural areas as well) 
have different characteristics. Size, maturity and credit conditions tend to be 
differentiated according to the lender. Formal lenders tend to provide larger and 
longer credits with more conditions and higher transactions costs, semi formal 
lenders tend to be more flexible but provide smaller and shorter credits, and 
informal lenders are completely flexible, they base their decisions in long term 
relationship with the borrowers and provide specific credits to serve specific 
needs. 
 
4. Credit technology varies widely among lenders. The main technological 
difference appears between formal and informal lenders. Semi formal lenders 
are in a middle position, sometimes near the formal sector and others near the 
informal sector. 
 
5. One could say that formal and informal lenders have a complementary 
relationship. The formal lenders serve one type of need and clients and the 
informal serve a different demand. The semi formal lenders, however, are in a 
different position. Some portion of the semi formal lenders is complementing the 
activities of the formal sector while the other portion is competing with them. 
 
6. Formal and semi formal lenders are crucial to develop the agricultural credit 
market. However, only formal lenders are considered by the government when 
financial or sectoral policies are established. We need to learn about semi 
formal lenders and about their interactions and responses to improve credit 
access in vulnerable sectors such as agriculture; especially considering that 
agricultural clients are usually small farmers with low incomes, who make their 
first contact with credit markets through non formal lenders. 
 
7. Econometric results show that the prevailing relationship among lenders is one 
of competence and not of complementarity. This result suggest that non formal 
lenders are responding to public policy as formal lenders. 
 
8. We need to learn how to deal with the complex structure of lenders in our credit 
market. It is necessary to understand the real dynamics of the sector to improve 
market activity and improve the performance of state intervention in that market. 
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9. There is much to do in this sector, but we need to stop considering the problem 
of lack of credit for agriculture as just a problem of lack of formal access to credit. 
There is room for all agents in this market. We need to empower their activities 
in order to promote competitiveness. 
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CMAC: Caja Municipal de Ahorro y Crédito (Local non-banking entity of savings and 
loans) 
 
ENNIV: Encuesta Nacional de Niveles de Vida (National Enquiry of Standards of 
Life) 
 
EDPYME: Entidades de Desarrollo de las Pequeñas y Microempresas 
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Annex 1: Probit estimations 
 
Estimates to explore the type of relationship between formal and non formal lenders 
for rural households are based on the following model, known as Seemingly 
Unrelated Bivariate Probit8. Based on the characteristics of the data set, model 
specification will be as follows:  
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Where: 
Y*1i = Probability of having formal credit 
Y    = Cases with formal credit. 1i
Y*2i = Probability of having non formal credit 
Y2i   = Cases with formal credit. 
x1i y x2i = Explanatory variables (listed below the estimation report)  
  = Estimation parameters 
1i y 2i = Normal bivariate error terms  
 
 
Estimation results are: 
 
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit Number of obs = 400 
Wald χ2(16) = 44.90 
Log likelihood = -389.79585  Prob > χ2 = 0.0001 
 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z|  95%  Conf. Interval] 
 
 
FORMAL 
sexojef -0.2504372 0.2381109 -1.052 0.293 -0.717126 0.2162516
edadjef 0.0697839 0.0541474 1.289 0.197 -0.0363429 0.1759108
edadsq -0.0005072 0.0005141 -0.986 0.324 -0.0015148 0.0005005
edujef 0.1217857 0.0465614 2.616 0.009 0.0305269 0.2130444
depen -0.0064257 0.0054744 -1.174 0.240 -0.0171552 0.0043039
pobres -0.3701274 0.1727965 -2.142 0.032 -0.7088024 -0.0314525
yprodu_ 0.0000246 8.79E-06 2.797 0.005 7.36E-06 0.0000418
dummyjun -0.1823516 0.1879324 -0.97 0.332 -0.5506924 0.1859891
_cons -3.406487 1.478981 -2.303 0.021 -6.305236 -0.5077371
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8 For a detailed analysis of this model, see Greene (2000), pages 849 - 859. 
 
NOFORMAL 
sexojef 0.0646377 0.2011343 0.321 0.748 -0.3295783 0.4588537
edadjef 0.0052699 0.0380623 0.138 0.890 -0.0693309 0.0798707
edadsq -0.0001414 0.0003602 -0.392 0.695 -0.0008474 0.0005647
edujef 0.0290344 0.0388207 0.748 0.455 -0.0470528 0.1051215
depen -0.0003774 0.0039065 -0.097 0.923 -0.008034 0.0072792
pobres 0.3310894 0.1433126 2.31 0.021 0.0502019 0.611977
yprodu_ 0.0000257 0.0000137 1.872 0.061 -1.20E-06 0.0000525
dummyjun 0.0645942 0.1499276 0.431 0.667 -0.2292584 0.3584468
_cons 0.1089647 1.066037 0.102 0.919 -1.980429 2.198358
 
/athrho -0.1137036 0.1095606 -1.038 0.299 -0.3284384 0.1010313
 
rho -0.1132161 0.1081563 -0.3171169 0.1006889
 
 
Likelihood ratio test of rho=0: 
χ2(1)= 1.083 Pr > χ
2 = 0.2980 
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rho -0.1132161 0.1081563 -0.3171169 0.1006889
 
Likelihood ratio test of rho=0: χ2(1) = 1.083 Pr > χ
2 = 0.2980 
 
Where: 
sexojef: sex of the head of the household  
edadjef: age of the head of the household 
edadsq: (edadjef)2 
edujef: level of formal education of the head of the household 
depen: number of family dependants 
pobres: 1 if the household is below the poverty line, 0 if not 
yprodu: income derive from agriculture 
dummyjun: dummy variable = 1 if household is located in Junin. 
 
Estimation results show a rho < 0, (rho = -0.11) rho that fits in the 95% confidence 
interval, suggesting an imperfect substitution relationship between formal and non 
formal lenders. 
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